In 2009 sponsored search advertisements generated over $11 billion in revenue for search engines in the US market. Most of these advertisements were sold using an auction mechanism. Several existing papers analyze the auction mechanism currently used under the assumption that customers are only accessed through sponsored links. We extend this literature to incorporate two important market features. In particular, we consider the impact of a second access channel, organic search listings which appear beneath the sponsored links, and we allow for the possibility that both relevance of the advertising …rm as well as its position in the sponsored link listings impact the clickthrough-rate. Our results demonstrate that the existence of an outside alternative leads to less aggressive bidding behavior. The outside alternative also creates an important role for the minimum cost-per-click established by the search engine in maximizing auction revenue. In contrast to equilibrium results in the existing literature, the …rm with the highest value per click does not necessarily win the …rst spot in the sponsored search listings. Moreover, under certain conditions, …rms adopt a mixed strategy with regard to participation in the keyword auction, but have a pure bidding stratgey when they do enter the auction.
Introduction
Many …rms now have a presence in both traditional and electronic markets. In electronic markets …rms typically rely on consumers accessing the …rm through a commercial website where customers can …nd product information, order products, and pay directly. Key issues for …rms with a website include visibility to the online audience of potential customers and the ability to convert online investments into revenue. Firms can use several strategies for this purpose. Search engine optimization (SEO) can increase the visibility of a website by improving its position among organic links on popular search engines. This strategy requires building a dense network of links and trackbacks through, for example, active participation in social networks or better internal organization of the website (e.g. cross linking, URL normalization). Yet, SEO has inherent limits because website designers are dependent on search engines regarding both the algorithm used to rank websites and the frequency of search engine (SE ) updates. As a consequence, the …nal position of a website in the organic links generated by the SE could appear somewhat random, and the e¤ects of any SEO strategy should be evaluated in the medium run only.
Websites also may use online advertising as an active strategy to improve their visibility. 1 Since the end of the 1990s, the online advertising market has rapidly developed both in terms of technological possibilities (e.g. tracking opportunities) and business models (pay-per-click, pay-per-print, pay-per-sale). 2 The most prominent segment of the online advertising market is sponsored search. Sponsored search enables …rms to display sponsored ads alongside organic results produced by the SE. In 2009 sponsored search advertisements generated over $11 billion in revenue for search engines in the US market and e6.7 billion in the European market (Source IAB). Most of these advertisements were sold through keyword auctions. The keyword segment is the largest segment of the sponsored search market in terms of revenues (more than 45%) and is the segment with the highest growth rate (+10% compared to 2008). One important factor explaining the success of sponsored search is the fact that it provides a balanced compromise between several concerns. First, sponsored links are displayed together with organic links. From a user's perspective, they appear to be less intrusive than other types of ads (e.g. pop-up windows or e-mail advertising). From the advertiser's perspective, they provide the ability to better target di¤erent customers based on their search query. This results in more quali…ed tra¢ c viewing the sponsored ads.
Finally, sponsored search is largely based on a pay-per-click principle which is less costly for advertisers because they only incur a charge if the sponsored ad is su¢ ciently interesting to induce a consumer to click on the advertised link.
A growing body of economics and marketing literature is focused on keyword advertising and the response of …rms and consumers to this advertising channel. A …rst strand of this literature addresses keyword advertising from the point of view of search engines (SE).
Based on auctions models, the seminal papers of Varian (2007) and of Edelman et al. (2007) examine the speci…city of keyword auctions as compared to traditional auctions and look for an optimal auction design to maximize SE revenue. Several subsequent studies have extended this analysis by considering more speci…c issues in the design of online auctions. Most of these extensions analyze keyword bidding strategies under the assumption that customers are only accessed through sponsored links. Our paper contributes to this literature by incorporating several speci…c attributes of keyword auction markets. We consider the impact of a second access channel, organic search listings which appear beneath the sponsored links. We allow for the possibility that both the relevance of the advertising …rm as well as its position in the sponsored and organic link listings impact the click-through-rate for each listing. Finally, we allow for the possibility that a customer may click on more than one of the links presented in the search listings.
Our model enables us to examine how organic and sponsored links impact the keyword advertising strategies of individual …rms and the reservation bids established by the search engines when websites di¤er according to their popularity or relevance (the probability that a searching customer will click on a given …rms sponsored or organic link). We demonstrate that sponsored links induce two opposite e¤ects; a 'crowding out' e¤ect (sponsored links reduce tra¢ c to organic links) and a 'market expansion e¤ect'(the use of sponsored links increases the overall click-through rate) relative to a market with no sponsored links. When the crowding out e¤ect for a particular …rm is large, then that …rm has little incentive to participate in the keyword auction because creating a sponsored link substantially reduces the …rms ability to attract customers through its organic link. As a result, the existence of organic links leads to less aggressive bidding, and, in contrast to equilibrium results in much of the existing literature, the …rm which is most relevant or has the highest value per click does not necessarily win the …rst spot in the sponsored search listings. The interplay between crowding out and market expansion e¤ects also creates an important role for the reservation price (minimum cost-per-click) established by the search engine that has not been considered in previous literature. In particular, the SE can minimize the e¤ect of less competitive bidding by increasing the minimum cost per click. Under certain conditions, the SE establishes a reservation price causes a less popular …rm to use a sponsored link to increase its tra¢ c while a more popular …rm submits a relatively low bid or chooses not to participate to the keyword auction at all. In such equilibria the more popular …rm relies on organic links to attract customers. We also demonstrate that for some parameterizations of our model, …rms may not participate systematically in the keyword auction but play mixed strategies instead. In contrast to previous papers, the mixed strategies apply not to the bids submitted by each website but to the decision regarding whether or not to participate in the keyword auction.
Our approach is most similar to Work by Xu et. al. (2009) and Katona and Sarvary (2009) who also consider the role of organic listing in the sponsored search market. One key distinction is that in our model the …rm's decision to participate in the keyword auction is endogenous and depends upon the minimum cost per click (cpc) established by the SE: In both Xu et. al. and Katona and Sarvary the SE has a …xed number of sponsored listings to sell, and these listings are allocated to the highest bidders. The minimum cpc is set to zero so there is no reason for …rms to refrain from participation in the keyword auction. Xu et al.
(2009) investigate a framework in which two …rms compete at two levels, both the keyword (advertising) market and the products market. 3 Firms sell a homogeneous product but are endowed with di¤erent marginal production costs. 4 There are two types of consumers;
shoppers that sample all …rms, and non-shoppers that only sample the …rm listed …rst in the search results. They …nd that the 'disadvantaged'…rm (higher production cost) always has an incentive to be ranked …rst while the …rm with the lower production cost has an incentive to bid aggressively only when the advantage from being ranked …rst signi…cant. The e¤ect of keyword advertising on the price of the product is ambiguous. Katona and Sarvary (2009) consider a …rst-price auction and show that a less popular site can be ranked before a more popular …rm in the list of sponsored links. They also extend these results by considering a dynamic setting to account for customer loyalty over time.
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A related strand of the literature emphasizes the role of sponsored links in reducing consumer search costs (see increased competition in the …nal product market which ultimately reduces SE pro…t.
The last strand in this literature analyses sponsored search empirically to better understand user response to keyword search results and SE strategies. Ghose and Yang (2009) examine how keywords impact consumer behavior and …nd that retailer-speci…c and brandspeci…c information in paid ads increases the e¢ ciency of online advertising; the former increases the click-through-rate (the number of clicks over the number of times the ad is displayed) and the latter increases the conversion rates into sales. Agarwal et al. (2006) …nd that while the click-through-rate decreases with position, the conversion rate …rst increases 2 The Model 2.1 Consumers'behavior on the search engine
We consider a duopoly market with search advertising in which …rst …rm, Firm 1 has a higher probability of being relevant to consumers than the second …rm, Firm 2. In particular, a randomly chosen consumer who conducts a search on a given keyword which produces only organic links will …nd the search result listing of …rm 1 relevant with probability 1 ; and the listing of …rm 2 relevant with probability 2 where 1 1 > 2 0: Because Firm 1 is more relevant, in the absence of any search advertising, the results of the search engine algorithm will always list Firm 1 …rst and Firm 2 second. To allow for the possibility that sponsored search may expand the market, we assume that if sponsored links are present, then the probability a consumer will …nd Firm i's sponsored link relevant is i i : To account for the fact that some consumers may not be willing to look through all sponsored links, we assume that a fraction of consumers will consider all of the sponsored links, but a fraction (1 ) will only consider the …rst sponsored link and will then move on to the organic links if the …rst sponsored link is not relevant These customers only consider the organic link of the …rm listed second in the sponsored links (i:e:; they do not consider the organic link of the …rm whose sponsored link they previously rejected). If this organic link is relevant, they click on it. Finally, to allow for the possibility that some consumers are averse to utilizing sponsored links, we de…ne as the probability that a consumer …rst considers the sponsored links if any sponsored links appear, and 1 as the probability a consumer bypasses the sponsored links and goes directly to the organic links. Given the above search behavior, the (sponsored link-averse) consumer will click on the …rst relevant organic link she encounters. We are now able to determine the click-through-rate for each …rm as a function of the advertising strategies adopted by each …rm.
Each …rm has the option to pay a fee to the search engine (SE) in order to have a sponsored link appear at the top of the search results. If only one of the two …rms sponsors a link, then a link to that …rm will appear as the …rst listing on the search results page. This sponsored link is followed by the organic results which always list Firm 1 …rst and Firm a rule determining which of the two …rms is listed …rst in the sponsored links area of the search results. The strategy of the search engine is modeled in section 3.
Click-through-rates
Consider the expected click through rates when neither …rm sponsors a link. The probability that a consumer clicks on Firm 1's link is 1 : We assume a consumer who clicks on Firm 1's link also considers clicking on the link to Firm 2 with probability (t 1) =t; where t 1 . If t = 1, it means that a consumer only clicks on one link (at most) ; after visiting Firm 1 or Firm 2's website, she will never visit further links on the result page. So the probability that a consumer clicks on the link to Firm 2 is ((
The probability calculations are somewhat more complex if one of the two …rms chooses to advertise. For example, if Firm 2 sponsors a link and Firm 1 does not, then Firm 2's sponsored link appears at the top of the search results followed by the organic links to Firm 1 and then Firm 2. The probability that a consumer clicks on Firm 2's sponsored link is 2 ; on Firm 2's organic link is (1 ) (1 1 =t) 2 ; and on Firm 1's organic link is (1
The di¤erences in click-through rates when neither …rm sponsors a link versus when Firm 2 sponsors a link highlight both a market expansion e¤ect and a crowding out e¤ect that result from sponsoring a link. With no sponsored links, the total capture rate of consumers is 1 + 2 1 2 =t: When Firm 2 sponsors a link, this increases to 1 + 2 1 2 =t + ( 2 2 ) (1 1 =t) which is a net increase of ( 2 2 ) (1 1 =t) : There is also a crowding-out e¤ect in which some consumers who would have clicked on organic links in the absence of advertising, switch to the sponsored link instead. Firm 1's organic click through rate decreases from 1 to (1 2 =t) 1 ; and …rm 2's organic click-through rate decreases from (1
The overall crowding-out e¤ect is ( 2 + ( 2 2 ) 1 =t) : If both …rms sponsor a link, then the click-through rates depend upon which …rm is listed …rst in the sponsored links. If Firm 1's sponsored link appears …rst, then the click through rate for …rm 1 is 1 + (1 ) 1 ; and the click through rate for …rm 2 is (1 
Firms'revenues
Firms are interested in maximizing pro…t generated by the search channel. We assume that revenues are directly correlated with click through rates. In particular, we let v i denote the expected value to …rm i from a customer that clicks on a link to …rm i: denote the pro…t for …rm i when both …rms have sponsored links and …rm i's sponsored link appears in position k: Using the above table, the expected cost of attracting a customer can be calculated and subtracted from the click through rate to determine the expected pro…t 6 If the probablity that a click on a link to …rm i is converted to a sale is i (i.e., the conversion rate is i ); and the average value of a sale at …rm i is s i ; then v i = i s i : For simplicity, we assume that i is the same whether the customer was encountered through a sponsored link as an organic link. However, the model does allow for di¤erences in the probability a customer clicks on a sponsored versus an organic link. under each possible strategy pro…le. If neither …rm advertises, then
If only Firm 1 advertises, then
If only Firm 2 advertises, then
If both …rms advertise, then each …rm's click-through rate depends upon the placement of its sponsored listing. If …rm 1 is listed …rst, then
If …rm 2 is listed …rst when both …rms advertise, then
In the next section, we determine equilibrium bidding strategies of …rms 1 and 2. They have …rst to decide whether they want to participate to the bidding process and then how much they bid.
3 Generalized Second Price Auction
Cost per click and keyword auction mechanism
Consider a generalized second price auction in which the …rm's location in the sponsored links generated by the search engine is determined by a combination of the …rm's bid and its relevance (this corresponds to the mechanism currently used by Google). We let c denote the minimum cost per click established by the search engine. 7 This de…nes the minimum bid to participate to the auction. We assume that the cost per click is c for a speci…c …rm i if both …rms advertise and i is listed second or if i is the only …rm that advertises
In choosing the location of each bidder, the search engine considers the expected revenue generated by the …rm, where the expected revenue per searching customer from listing …rm 1 …rst is and will list …rm 2 …rst otherwise. Noting that either …rm pays a cpc of c if is is listed second, if bids are such that …rm 1 is listed …rst, then …rm 1 pays a cost-per-click (cpc) of
where the inequality follows from the assumption that b 2 > c; and …rm 2 pays a cpc of c: If bids are such that …rm 2 is listed …rst, then …rm 1 pays a cpc of c and
7 For example, estimates provided by the Google AdWords keyword tool suggest that Googles sets a minimum cost per click of $.05 for any keyword.
Given the assumption that 1 > 2 ; …rm 1 may be listed …rst even if it bids less than …rm 2 (i.e. if …rm 1 bids between p 1;1 and b 2 ) and …rm 2 must bid strictly more than …rm 1 in order to be listed …rst. The premium that …rm 2 must pay in order to be listed …rst (p 2;1 b 1 ) is increasing in 1 and decreasing in 2 : In the limiting case in which 1 ! 2 ; the search engine will simply rank the …rms according to their bids. In addition, the premium is decreasing in and c: This result is intuitive. Recall that represents the probability that a consumer considers all of the sponsored links (while with probability 1 a consumer only considers the …rst sponsored link and then moves on to the organic links). As increases, the cost to the search engine of listing the less relevant Firm 2 …rst (in terms of revenue that could have been gained by listing the sponsored link to the more relevant Firm 1 …rst instead) decreases because a consumer who determines that Firm 2's sponsored link is not relevant is more likely to consider (and potentially click on) the sponsored link to …rm 1; which generates revenue of c for the SE: Similarly, the revenue generated by a consumer who rejects the sponsored link to Firm 2 and then clicks on the sponsored link to Firm 1 is increasing in c:
Equilibrium bidding strategies
The pro…t functions under each scenario can be used to create a payo¤ matrix for the game in which the …rms simultaneously determine their advertising strategies. There will be an equilibrium in which neither …rm chooses to advertise if 
which imply that …rm 1 will prefer not to advertise conditional on …rm 2 not advertising if c v 1 (1 1 = 1 ) c 1 ; and …rm 2 will prefer not to advertise conditional on …rm 1 not advertising if c v 2 1 1 1 t 2 = 2 c 2 . An equilibrium in which neither …rm advertises exists if c max fc 1 ; c 2 g : If the search engine establishes a minimum cost-per-click c < max fc 1 ; c 2 g ; then at least one …rm will advertise with strictly positive probability.
Firm 1 prefers to advertise and be listed …rst over advertising and being listed second if
which implies
Firm 1 prefers to advertise and be listed …rst over not advertising given …rm 2 does advertise
Firm 1 prefers to advertise and be listed second over not advertising given …rm 2 advertises
If c >p 1;2 ; then …rm 1 prefers not advertising over advertising and being listed second given …rm 2 advertises. Note thatp 1 =p 1 when c =p 1;2 : If c >p 1;2 ; thenp 1 >p 1 ; and if c <p 1;2 ; thenp 1 <p 1 :
Lemma 1p 1 > c 1 >p 1;2 for all t > 1; and v 1 (1 1 = 1 ) =p 1;2 for t = 1:
Proof. This follows directly fromp 1 c 1 = 1 t 1 2 v 1 > 0 and from c 1 p 1;2 =
(1 2 ) (t 1) : Firm 2 prefers to advertise and be listed …rst over advertising and being listed second if
Firm 2 prefers to advertise and be listed …rst over not advertising given …rm 1 advertises if
Note thatp 2 = c 2 : Finally, …rm 2 prefers to advertise and be listed second over not advertising given …rm 1 advertises if
Note thatp 2 >p 2 when c >p 2;2 :
Lemma 2p 2 > c 2 >p 2;2 for all t 1:
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 If c < min fp 1;2 ;p 2;2 g ; then in equilibrium Firm 1 bidsp 1 and Firm 2 bids Proof. Firm 1 always bids because c p 1;2 implies …rm 1 is better o¤ advertising and being listed second than not advertising. Firm 1 bids the maximum amountp 1 that it is willing to pay to be listed …rst. Note that ; then …rm 1 bidsp 1 ; …rm 2 does not bid, and …rm 1 pays a cpc of c:
Proof. Because c > max fp 1;2 ;p 2;2 g ; …rm i prefers advertising and being listed …rst over not advertising, but prefers not advertising over advertising and being listed second (because the cpc from being listed second exceedsp i;2 ): Also, c > max fp 1;2 ;p 2;2 g impliesp i >p i ; sô p i is the maximum …rm i is willing to pay if it is listed …rst. Finally, lemmas 1 and 2 implŷ p i > c; so each …rm is willing to pay the cpc c if it is listed …rst, but will not bid if it will be listed second. ; then there is a mixed strategy equilibrium in which …rms decide to bid randomly and submit a bid ofp i when they do bid.
Proof. The proof that …rm 1 bids and …rm 2 does not ifp 2 < 
then …rm 2 is willing to pay the premium required to be listed …rst. But if …rm 2 is listed …rst, then …rm 1 prefers not to advertise. However, if …rm 1 advertises with probability 0, then …rm 2 will choose not to advertise, but then …rm 1 prefers to advertise because c < c 1 :
Thus, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. Note that in an equilibrium with mixed strategies, if both …rms bidp i ; then …rm 2 is listed …rst. Letting i denote the probability that …rm i advertises, the equilibrium in mixed strategies satis…es
Proposition 9 Suppose c 2 > c > c 1 and c > max fp 1;2 ;p 2;2 g :
; then …rm 2 bidsp 2 ; …rm 1 does not bid, and …rm 2 pays a cpc of c:
there is a mixed strategy equilibrium in which …rms decide to bid randomly and submit a bid ofp i when they do bid.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof in proposition 8.
The above propositions generate several insights into the role of the various parameters on the bids submitted by each …rm. Note that in equilibrium each …rm will either bidp i or p i : Comparative statics results presented in the appendix demonstrate that optimal bids are strictly decreasing in t; non-increasing in 1 ; and 2 ; and strictly increasing in 1 and 2 :
As t (a measure of consumers'propensity to visit multiple links) increases, the premium required to be listed …rst decreases because a consumer who clicks on the …rst sponsored link is more likely to click on the second sponsored link as well. For the same reason, as t increases the bene…t to a given …rm of being listed …rst decreases. This causes bidding for sponsored links to become less competitive and the optimal bids decrease.
As 1 (a measure of the natural relevance of …rm 1) increases, …rm 1 has less incentive to advertise because the value of its organic link increases in 1 : As a result, the bidsp 1 andp 1 that …rm 1 might submit are both decreasing in 1 : However, Firm 2 has a greater incentive to advertise because if Firm 2 does not advertise, as 1 increases, there is a lower probability Firm 2 will bidp 2 ; andp 2 does not depend upon 1 : Similarly, an increase in 2 causes …rm 2 to bid less competitively, but has no impact on the bids of …rm 1 because any customer who considers the organic link to …rm 2 already will have considered the organic link to …rm 1. Increases in 1 and 2 both increase competition for sponsored links.
The impact of changes in v 1 and on optimal bidding strategies is less clear. The optimal bidsp 1 andp 1 of …rm 1 are increasing in v 1 if and only if 1 is su¢ ciently small. In this case, the market expansion e¤ect dominates the crowding out e¤ect so that more competitive bidding by …rm 1 for a sponsored link is optimal when v 1 increases. An increase in v 2 ; on the other hand, always leads to more competitive bidding by …rm 2: As the fraction of consumers who consider all sponsored links increases, bidding for sponsored links by …rm i becomes more competitive if and only if i is su¢ ciently large and c <p i;2 ; so thatp i >p i :
Optimal Search Engine Strategy
The Search Engine (SE) optimally chooses the minimum cost per click c in order to maximize expected search engine revenue from the generalized second price auction. As discussed in the previous section, the order in which the …rms are listed in the sponsored links when both …rms submit bids is not determined solely by which …rm submits the highest bid -the ordering also depends upon the probabilities i that consumers click on the sponsored links.
As demonstrated in subsection 3.2, the search engine's choice of the minimum cost per click c determines the bidding strategies of the two …rms. As propositions 3 through 9 demonstrate, the choice of c is critical to determining which proposition applies and what the resulting bidding strategies for each …rm will be. However, it is not obvious how changes in c will impact SE pro…t. For the bidding …rms, an increase in c makes the alternative of relying on organic links for which the …rms incur no cost-per-click relatively more attractive which suggests bidding for sponsored links would become less competitive. However, because the …rm listed second pays a cpc of c; if both …rms bid on sponsored links, then an increase in c reduces the incremental cost the …rm listed second must pay in order to be listed …rst. At the margin, this makes a bid increase attractive to the …rm listed second, and increases competition for the …rst spot in the sponsored links. From proposition 3 and the de…nitions ofp 1 andp 2 ; it is apparent that the second e¤ect dominates when c is relatively low (c < min fp 1;2 ;p 2;2 g), so an increase in c leads to more competitive bidding (higher bids) However, once c exceedsp i;2 , …rm i is no longer willing to pay for a sponsored link that is listed second because …rm i's return from not advertising is greater than its return from advertising and being listed second. In this case, …rm i only bids if the maximum amount p i that it is willing to pay to be listed …rst is su¢ cient to ensure that …rm i is listed …rst in the sponsored links. The bidp i does not depend upon c because for …rm i the alternative of relying only on organic links for which there is no cpc dominates being listed second if c >p i;2 :
In addition, as the following lemma demonstrates, the actual payments made by each …rm in an equilibrium in which both …rms adopt pure advertising strategies are increasing in c:
Lemma 10 When both …rms advertise, the cost per click paid by Firm 1; ; are increasing in c:
Proof. Substituting the expressions forp i yields
This lemma combined with propositions 3, 5, and 6 implies that in any equilibrium in which both …rms bid with probability 1, the cpc paid by each …rm is increasing in the minimum cost per click set by the search engine. This follows from the fact that in any such equilibrium the payment made by the …rm listed …rst in the sponsored listings is one of the two expressions in lemma 10, and the cpc for the …rm listed second is c: This lemma implies that if the SE maximizes pro…t under conditions satisfying proposition 3, then c = min fp 1;2 ;p 2;2 g ; if it maximizes pro…t under conditions satisfying proposition 5, then c =p 1;2 ;
and if it maximizes pro…t under conditions satisfying proposition 7, then c = min fc 1 ; c 2 g :
In each of these cases, raising c increases the actual payment made by all participants in the auction without changing the …rms that participate. A similar statement cannot be made about propositions 6, 9 or 8 because in the conditions satisfying any of these propositions, and increase in c may cause one of the two …rms to drop out of the auction. Thus, the SE must compare pro…t with both …rms bidding under a lower c with pro…t achieved with only one …rm sponsoring a link at a price equal to the upper bound for c in the proposition.
Unfortunately, the general conditions under which the SE prefers to set c so that both …rms bid, only one …rm bids, or …rms adopt a mixed strategy are quite complex and do not provide straightforward intuition. Therefore, to gain further insight into the optimal SE strategy, we consider several examples.
Numerical examples
In the …rst example, suppose = t = 1;(consumers consider all of the sponsored links, but when they click on a sponsored or organic link, they never click on other links later) and v 1 = kv 2 where k > 1: Under these assumptions,p 1;2 = c 1 ; andp 2;2 = c 2 ; so the conditions of propositions 6 through 9 cannot apply. In additionp 1;2 >p 2;2 if and only if k >
Suppose this condition holds. If c =p 2;2 ; then proposition 3 applies, so …rms will bidp i ; and …rm 1 is listed …rst and pays 
Note that this pro…t is increasing in both 1 and 2 :
If the SE increases c; then proposition 5 applies. Becausep 2 < 1 2p
will not bid on a sponsored link, and c =p 1;2 is optimal for the SE: In this case, SE pro…t is 1p1;2 = ( 1 1 ) kv: Subtracting pro…t when c =p 1;2 from pro…t when c =p 2;2 yields v
which is positive if
. Thus, if
; then it is optimal for the SE to set c =p 2;2 and induce both …rm 1 and …rm 2 to bid on sponsored links. However, if k >k; then it is optimal for the SE to establish a higher minimum cpc of c =p 1;2 even though doing so will result in only …rm 1 bidding on a sponsored link. This example demonstrates that setting c su¢ ciently small to induce both …rms to advertise is optimal if v 1 is not too much larger than v 2 : However, if v 1 is substantially larger than v 2 (i:e:; if k is su¢ ciently large), then the SE should set a high cost per click that excludes …rm 2 from the sponsored link competition.
Another simple example considers the case in which v 1 = v 2 = v; and 2 = 0 so the less relevant …rm 2 is completely excluded from the organic listings. In this casep 2 = c 2 =p 2;2 = v: It can be shown that if 1 < ( 1 2 ) = (1 2 ) ; then the SE sets c =p 1;2 ; both …rms bid on sponsored links, and …rm 1 is listed …rst. In this case, even though …rm 2 is willing to pay v to be listed …rst in the sponsored links, a bid of v is not su¢ cient for …rm 2 to be listed …rst because …rm 1 submits a bid close to v and has a higher click through rate, so the SE lists …rm 1 …rst in the sponsored links. For slightly larger values of 1 ; the SE still sets c =p 1;2 ; both …rms bid, and …rm 2 is listed …rst. Finally, as 1 ! 1 ; the SE sets c = v and extracts all possible surplus from …rm 2, which is willing to pay v. This …nal outcome is also more likely as t increases, because as t increases …rm 1 is more willing to rely on attracting customers through its organic link. t 1 t 1 + 2 1 + t 1 t 2 t 1 +t 2 + t 1 2 t 2 1 t 1 2 + t 2 1
Alternatively, the SE could set c =p 1;2 : In this case, proposition proposition 5 implies that …rm 2 will only bid on a sponsored link ifp 2 > : Thus, the SE maximizes expected pro…t by setting low value of c to induce greater competition between the two …rms in their bidding for a sponsored link. This result is intuitive because if 1 is large, then …rm 1 has relatively little incentive to bid on a sponsored link particularly if the cpc for customers who arrive through the sponsored link is large. The best the SE can do is set c to extract the maximum possible surplus from having …rm 1 listed second, and this occurs when c =p 1;2 :
Furthermore, if 1 is su¢ ciently large, then c 2 > c 1 : Using this and propositions 7 and 8 it can be shown that further increases in c result in only …rm 2 sponsoring a link and reduce
This example shows that when …rms have an alternative of relying on organic links to attract customers, it is possible that the optimal bidding strategies will result in the less relevant …rm (…rm 2) being listed …rst in the sponsored listings. Furthermore, in this particular example, the SE sets c su¢ ciently high so that …rm 2 is the only …rm that sponsors a link in equilibrium. This result relies on 1 being su¢ ciently large (or, alternatively, on 1 being su¢ ciently small or 2 being su¢ ciently close to 1 ), so that for …rm 1, its organic link attracts enough customers relative to the alternative of a sponsored link.
Managerial implications and concluding remarks
This paper investigates strategic behavior of …rms on a search engine. We develop a comprehensive framework to account for the existence of asymmetry between these …rms. First, some …rms may be more relevant for customers than others (i.e. they have a higher probability to be clicked on their organic link). Second, …rms may di¤er in the value generated by each consumer that visits their websites (i.e. some …rms can extract more revenues from a consumer than others). Our model also integrates several empirical features regarding consumers behavior on search engine. First, our model closely mimics consumer behavior (successive iterations) when considering a result page. Second, it also explicitly integrates the possibility for some consumers to bypass sponsored links or to consider only the …rst sponsored linked as documented in the literature on browsing behavior.
Our framework allows us to determine what parameters are important for bidding strategies and how they a¤ect the decision to bid and the amount of bidding. Our results highlight three kinds of equilibrium outcomes. In the …rst equilibrium outcome both …rms bid on sponsored links. Under such an equilibrium, either …rm can be listed …rst in the sponsored links.
In general, the more relevant …rm, …rm 1, is more likely to be listed …rst as the di¤erence 1 2 in the relevance of each …rm in the sponsored links increases, because this implies consumers are more likely to click on …rm 1's sponsored link, so the SE prefers to list …rm 1 …rst. In addition, as 1 decreases ( 2 increases), …rm 1's bid becomes more competitive relative to …rm 2, which also makes it more likely that …rm 1 will be listed …rst.
The second type of equilibrium outcome involves the search engine setting the minimum cpc su¢ ciently high that only one of the two …rms bids in the keyword auction. This equilibrium occurs which there is a signi…cantly large di¤erence in the willingness to pay between the two …rms. For example, if …rm 1 has a relatively high click through rate 1 on its organic links and …rm 2 does not, then it may be optimal for the SE to set c high enough so that …rm 1 chooses not to bid in the keyword auction. Similarly, if the value v 2 to …rm 2 of attracting customer is much higher than v 1 ; then the SE will optimally set a high value of c which extracts surplus from …rm 2 while excluding …rm 1: The analysis also demonstrates how the SE's ability to extract surplus in this manner is constrained by each …rm's ability to attract customers through its organic links.
The …nal type of equilibrium involved the …rms adopting mixed strategies to determine whether to participate in the auction process. This equilibrium requires that the SE set c su¢ ciently large that one of the two …rms, say …rm 1, is better o¤ not advertising if …rm 2 also chooses not to advertise, but …rm 2 is better o¤ advertising and paying c if …rm 1 does not advertise, and …rm 1 is better o¤ advertising and being listed …rst if …rm 2 does advertise.
The results and speci…c examples presented above demonstrate that organic listings can have a signi…cant impact on equilibrium in sponsored search auction -both in terms of the optimal bidding strategies and decision to participate in the auction by …rms, and the optimal reservation price established by the SE: In particular, the results are consistent with outcomes in auction sponsored search auctions in which less relevant …rms are often listed ahead of more relevant …rms in the sponsored links. The analysis also predicts that under certain conditions, highly relevant …rms will not appear at all in the sponsored links.
The model can be extended in several directions. Initial analysis extending the model to include more than two …rms suggests that it is possible that a Vickrey auction will generate more revenue for the SE than a generalized second price auction under certain conditions. This merits further investigation. Another possible extension would endogenize parameters and i as parts of the search engine strategy. Indeed, the SE has the possibility to improve the visibility of the …rst sponsored link (in contrast to the other sponsored and organic links). For instance, it may choose to display only one sponsored link at the top of a result page, all the other sponsored links being displayed at the left-hand-side of the page which is a less favorable location. In that case, the advantage given to the …rst sponsored links is signi…cantly increased. Secondly, one may empirically observe that for valuable or popular keywords, the ranking and the identity of sponsored links may change for two identical and successive requests. The ads displayed in the sponsored links section are the results of a random selection process of ranking. Yet, this creates some opportunity for the SE to "manipulate" the probability of clicking on a sponsored link ( i in our model) so as to extract more revenues from keywords advertising. 
:
Sign here is unclear. If c = v 1 ; then clearly this condition on 1 is always satis…ed andp 1 is increasing in . If c = 0; then 0 < dp 1 dv 1 = 1 t 1 (t 1 t 1 + t 1 t 1 + t 1 2 + 1 2 t 1 2 ) > 0 if and only if 1 < 1 (t(1 + 2 )) t(1 )(1 2 ) : dp 1 dc
